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The paper concerns performance analysis of a steganographic method, dedicated primarily for VoIP, 
which was recently filed for patenting [1] under the name LACK. The performance of the method 
depends on the procedure of inserting covert data into the stream of audio packets. After a brief 
presentation of the LACK method, the paper focuses on analysis of the dependence of the insertion 
procedure on the probability distribution of VoIP call duration.   
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Communication networks steganography is a method of hiding secret data inside usual data 
transmitted by users, so that the hidden data cannot be detected (in an ideal case) by scanning the 
data flow by a third party. A new steganographic method called LACK (Lost Audio PaCKets 
Steganography) was recently proposed and filed for patenting [1] in Poland. The method is 
described in some detail in [2].  
A detailed review of steganographic methods that may be applied for IP telephony can be 
found in [2] and [9]. In general, the methods can be classified into the two following groups: 
- Steganographic methods that modify packets: network protocol headers or payload fields. 
Examples of such solutions include modifications of free/redundant headers’ fields for IP, 
UDP or RTP protocols during conversation phase and signalling messages in e.g. SIP[10]. 
Information hiding which is based on affecting packets’ payload usually uses digital audio 
watermarking algorithms (e.g. DSSS [13] and QIM [14]), 
- Steganographic methods that modify packets’ time relations. Examples of such solution: 
affecting sequence order of RTP packets [11] and modifying their inter-packet delay [12]. 
 
With respect to the two above groups LACK is a hybrid steganographic method since it 
modifies both packets’ content and their time dependencies.  
In general, the LACK method is intended for a broad class of multimedia, real-time 
applications, but its main foreseen application (at least for now) is VoIP. The proposed method 
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utilises the fact that for usual multimedia communication protocols like RTP (Real-Time Transport 
Protocol) [3] excessively delayed packets are not used for reconstruction of transmitted data at the 
receiver (the packets are considered useless and discarded). The main idea of LACK is as follows. 
At the transmitter, some selected audio packets are intentionally delayed before transmitting. 
If the delay of such packets at the receiver is considered excessive, the packets are discarded by a 
receiver not aware of the steganographic procedure. The payload of the intentionally delayed 
packets is used to transmit secret information to receivers aware of the procedure so no extra 
packets are generated. For unaware receivers the hidden data is “invisible”.  
The effectiveness of LACK depends on many factors such as the details of the communication 
procedure (in particular the type of codec used, the size of the voice frame, the size of the receiving 
buffer, etc.) and on the network QoS (packet delay and packet loss probability). 
No real-world steganographic method is perfect – whatever the method, the hidden 
information can be potentially discovered. In general, the more hidden information is inserted into 
the data stream, the greater the chance that it will be detected, e.g. by scanning the data flow or by 
some other steganalysis methods. Moreover, the more audio packets are used to send covert data, 
the greater the deterioration of the quality of the VoIP connection. Thus the procedure of inserting 
hidden data should be carefully chosen and controlled in order to minimize the chance of detecting 
inserted data and to avoid excessive deterioration of the QoS.  
To avoid excessive deterioration of the QoS lost packet ratio must be kept below certain 
accepted level. This level depends on the speech codec used. For example, according to [8], 
maximum loss tolerance is 1% for G.723.1, 2% for G.729A, 3% for G.711 codecs. If special 
mechanism to deal with lost packets at the receiver is utilized, like the PLC (Packet Loss 
Concealment) [15], acceptable level of lost packets e.g. for the G.711 codec increases from 3% to 
5%. Thus this value provides us with upper limit for transmission rate.  
In general, the amount of steganographic data using LACK depends on the acceptable level of 
packet loss. For example, for the G.711 speech codec with data rate 64 kbit/s and data frame size of 
20 ms, if the packet loss probability introduced for LACK purposes is 0.5%, then under condition 
that packet losses do not exceed acceptable level, the theoretical hidden communication rate is 320 
b/s.  
In the present paper we shall focus on the hidden data insertion rate IR [bits/s]. Obviously, IR 
depends on the amount of hidden data to be sent and on the call duration. In principle, the call 
duration may be adjusted to the amount of hidden data to be sent. This however could cause that the 
distribution of calls applying LACK differs from the call duration distribution of LACK-less calls, 
and as a consequence make LACK vulnerable to statistical steganalysis based on call duration. Thus 
rather than adjusting the call duration to the amount of hidden data to be sent, it is preferable to 
adjust the hidden data insertion rate IR to LACK-less calls duration distribution. This, in turn, 
requires making IR dependent on that distribution. Obviously, this is not an important question in 
case of sporadic LACK use; it becomes important in case of a predefined group of frequent LACK 
users. In the present paper we focus on such a case. 
Moreover, in the presented analysis we consider the dependence of IR of a particular call on 
the elapsed time of that call, i.e. we consider IR that can (potentially) be made time dependent, 
adjusted to the foreseen residual call duration. As shown in our analysis, such time-dependent IR 
procedure potentially allows for decreasing the IR during the call duration, compared to the IR at 
call initiation time. In effect, the negative influence of LACK on QoS can be decreased. Such an 
effect can be achieved for call duration distributions with coefficient of variation greater than 1; 
available experimental data concerning VoIP call duration distributions seem to indicate that  this is 
a realistic assumption for real-life VoIP calls. 
It should be emphasised that the LACK procedure introduced in this paper can be utilized by 
decent LACK users who use their own VoIP calls to exchange covert data, but also by intruders 
who are able to covertly send data using third party VoIP calls (e.g. in effect of earlier successful 
attacks by using trojans or worms or by distribution of modified version of a popular VoIP 
software). This is a usual tradeoff  requiring consideration in a broader steganography context which 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
  
 
2. THE VoIP CALL DURATION DISTRIBUTION 
 
For PSTN the call duration probability distribution was well known based on extensive 
experimental research. For many decades an exponential distribution was assumed a good enough 
approximation for engineering purposes. VoIP is a relatively new service and thus only few reliable 
experimental data is available, so in many research papers concerning IP voice traffic (e.g. [4], [5], 
[6]) the exponential call duration is still assumed. Current experiments prove however that this 
assumption is far from being realistic. 
Birke et al. [7] captured real VoIP traffic traces (about 150 000 calls) from FastWeb, an 
Italian telecom operator. The obtained call duration probability distribution is reproduced in Fig. 1 
with a solid line. To illustrate qualitatively the degree in which the experimental results differ from 
the exponential distribution and some other chosen distributions (hyperexponential and log-normal) 
these were drawn with broken lines in Fig.1. As can be seen, the differences are considerable and no 
straightforward approximation of the experimental data with standard distributions is available. In 
particular, the exponential distribution is far from being realistic.  
The experimental data yield average call duration E(D) = 117.31 and standard deviation 
σ(D) = 278.74, thus the coefficient of variation Cv = σ(D)/E(D) = 2.37 (for exponential distribution 
Cv= 1). 
To achieve an analytic approximation of the experimental data a combination of some 
standard distributions can be used, for example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 The above analytic approximation is quite complex and of little practical use for our 
purposes, i.e. for establishing the dependence of the insertion rate IR on some simple enough 
characterization of the call duration distribution. Our guess was that this can be achieved through 
characterizing a considerably wide range of call duration distribution types with the coefficient of 
variation Cv and then expressing the IR through Cv. 
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Fig. 1. VoIP call duration – comparison of experimental data with selected probability distributions 
 
A reasonably wide range of call distribution types can be achieved and effectively analyzed 
with the 2-parameter Weibull distribution, with appropriately chosen parameters: the shape 
parameter k > 0 and the scale parameter λ > 0. The complementary cumulative probability 
distribution function )( DF  and probability density function fD are as follows: 
  
 
 
(2) 
The λ parameter was set so to achieve the above experimental average call duration time E(D) 
= 117.31 and the k parameter was varied so to obtain a wide range of Cv values. In Table 1 the 
analyzed values are summarized. 
 
Weibull 
parameters 
k=3.4, 
λ=130.57 
k=2, 
λ=132.37 
k=1.2, 
λ=124.71 
k=1, 
λ=117.31 
k=0.8, 
λ=103.54 
k=0.6, 
λ=77.97 
k=0.5, 
λ=58.65 
k=0.4, 
λ=35.3 
CV 0.32 0.52 0.84 1 1.26 1.76 2.23 3.14 
Table 1. Chosen Weibull distribution parameters k and λ and corresponding Cv values. 
 
In Fig. 2 the Weibull probability distribution is depicted for the parameters from Tab. 1 to 
illustrate the resulting wide range of distribution shapes. Note by the way that for k = 1 the Weibull 
distribution equals the exponential distribution (Cv = 1), for k = 2 it becomes the Rayleigh 
distribution (Cv = 0.52) and for k = 3.4 it resembles the normal distribution (Cv=0.32). 
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Fig. 2. Weibull distribution for various k, λ and CV 
 
 
3. TIME DEPENDENT INSERTION RATE 
 
For an arbitrary instant of a call the average residual call duration is well know to be equal 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
or equivalently 
  
 
 
(4) 
 
Suppose that at the beginning of a call the insertion rate is set to IR = S/E(D), where S is 
amount of steganographic data to be sent covertly. As mentioned in section 1, if Cv>1, and thus 
E(R) > E(D), which seems to be the case for VoIP calls as indicated above, then beginning from 
some arbitrary instant of the call we may decrease the insertion rate to IR = S/E(R), which is 
beneficial from the point of view of QoS and resistance to detection of the hidden data. 
The above indicates that it reasonable to make the insertion rate dependent on the elapsed 
time of a call. It is nevertheless not practical to use the classical definition of residual call duration 
since it involves an arbitrary time instant and not the current call duration. We are rather interested 
in the expected call duration on condition it has already lasted t units of time:  
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thus 
 
 
 
(6) 
 
For the Weibull distributions considered in the previous section 
 
 
 
(7) 
and 
 
 
 
(8) 
 
For the parameters from Tab.1 we obtain results shown in Fig.3. The figure illustrates also the 
E(D|D>t) function for the experimental data presented in the previous section. 
The curves from Fig. 3 may be approximated with good accuracy as follows: 
 
 
 
 
(9) 
 
Using this simple approximation we may establish a time-dependent insertion rate we were 
looking for. Suppose that the amount of remaining steganographic data to be sent at time t is SR(t). 
Then the insertion rate at time t may be expressed as 
 
 
 
 
 
(10) 
  
Finally, we may modify the above IR(t) with a correction factor CF<1 to reflect the fact that 
the LACK procedure may decrease to some extent the QoS of the speech transmission and also to 
take account of the required robustness to steganalysis: IR*(t) = CF·IR(t). This however is a very 
simplified solution of the problem. 
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Fig. 3. E(D|D>t) for different Weibull distributions 
 
Based on results presented in Fig. 3 and equation 10, for chosen Weibull distributions, the 
IR(t) values are as presented in Fig. 4: 
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Fig. 4. IR(t) for different Weibull distributions for S=1000 bits 
 
As can be seen, call duration distributions with higher Cv yield higher IR values. In effect 
distributions with higher Cv allow to transmit more steganographic data. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
 
The LACK steganographic method is a new idea which requires detailed performance 
evaluation. This paper is only an initial step in this direction. We have focused only on one aspect, 
namely the dependence of the procedure for inserting hidden data on the call duration probability 
distribution. It was shown that the insertion rate may be effectively made dependent on the current 
call duration time, and that this dependence can be expressed with good accuracy through the  
coefficient of variation of the call duration probability distribution. The derived formulae are simple 
and can be straightforwardly implemented. The effectiveness of the resulting procedure will depend 
on the accuracy of the estimated mean call duration and the coefficient of variation of the call 
duration.  
The proposed procedure was made as simple as possible. A more sophisticated version of the 
procedure would require more detailed information about the call duration probability distribution, 
which might be too demanding considering the current limited experience with VoIP traffic. 
Nevertheless a theoretical research seems worthwhile. The authors have analyzed the problem of 
expressing the insertion rate function IR(t) through a P(D>x|D>t) distribution instead of the 
E(D|D>t) function which was considered in the present paper. The results will be presented in a 
future paper. 
Another task is to take into account the dependence of the IR(t) function on constraints 
implied by QoS requirements and by the required resistance of LACK to steganalysis. In the present 
paper we have practically not considered this problem apart from introducing a correction factor 
into the IR(t) which is clearly only an indication of the problem. 
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